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[1769] 
Piercing the Privacy Veil:  
Toward a Saner Balancing of Privacy and 
Health in Cases of Severe Mental Illness 
 
Jorgio Castro* 
On November 19, 2013, Virginia state senator and former candidate for governor Robert 
Creigh Deeds suffered a high-profile attack from his son, who had been diagnosed with 
schizophrenia, resulting in permanent injuries to himself and his son’s self-inflicted death. 
On June 16, 2015, Senator Deeds addressed Congress to highlight one of the biggest 
challenges to providing adequate intervention and support for his son—the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule’s restriction on the release of protected health information to family 
caretakers. Senator Deeds’s high-profile story emerged as a national indication of a 
serious problem: the immense difficulty experienced by families trying to obtain critical 
information regarding their loved one diagnosed with serious mental illness. While the 
delivery of adequate mental health treatment is a large and complicated effort governed 
by many regulatory statutes, advocates have identified in particular the barrier on 
receiving information from health care providers regarding their loved one’s illness—
particularly during involuntary psychiatric holds—as one key barrier to effectively 
assisting in their treatment. Although the Privacy Rule attempts to balance competing 
principles of respect for autonomy, the best interests of the patient, and efficiency of the 
system, it has created substantial barriers to effective treatment in this area without 
actually advancing its purposes. This Note suggests possible fixes for this exigent issue. 
 
 
 *  J.D. Candidate, 2015, University of California Hastings College of Law. I would like to thank 
Professors Robert Schwartz and Lois Weithorn, who have provided tremendous support, assistance, 
and feedback in the creation of this Note. Thank you to the staff of Hastings Law Journal for all of 
their work on this Note, especially Volume 66 Executive Notes Editor, H. Elliot Hosman, and Volume 
67 Executive Notes Editor, Elizabeth Lee. I would also like to thank my parents, extended family, and 
friends. This Note is dedicated to those suffering from serious mental illness, and the family and 
friends who love them and are struggling to help.  
R1 - Castro_14 (Dukanovic) (Do Not Delete) 8/27/2015  9:08 PM 
1770 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:1769 
Table of Contents 
Introduction .............................................................................................. 1770 
I.  The Privacy Rule in a Nutshell ....................................................... 1773 
A.  The Privacy Rule Currently Allows Health Care 
Providers to Deny Release of Information to Family 
Caretakers When a Family Member Is on a 
Psychiatric Hold ................................................................... 1775 
B.  The Privacy Rule Currently Mandates “Incapacity” 
to Allow Disclosure of Protected Health 
Information to Family Caregivers ..................................... 1778 
II.  Health Care Providers Have Incentives to Not Permit 
Disclosure, Even When They Can ................................................. 1779 
III.  Competency, Decisional Capacity, and the Decision to 
Release Information ......................................................................... 1783 
A.  The Doctrinal Underpinnings of Health Care 
Decisionmaking ...................................................................... 1786 
B.  Statutory Surrogates Act as Decisionmakers for 
Incapacitated Persons .......................................................... 1787 
C.  Psychiatric Advance Directives as Evidence of 
Incapacitated Persons’ Preferences .................................. 1789 
IV.  Solutions to Promote Disclosure ................................................. 1791 
A.  College Admissions Processes Could Encourage 
Advanced Consent to Release Information to 
Designated Family Members ............................................... 1791 
B.  Expansive Interpretation of “Treatment” Could 
Include Communications with Family Caregivers ......... 1794 
C.  An Amendment to the HIPAA Privacy Rule Can 
Clarify That Physicians Can Release Protected 
Health Information to a Family Caregiver ..................... 1795 
D.  Important Considerations ................................................... 1797 
1.  The Breadth of the Protected Health Information 
Released Would Fall Under Exceptions to the 
Minimum Necessary Rule ................................................. 1797 
2.  A Safety Rationale for Cabining PHI Disclosure to 
Family Members Generally Already Applies .................. 1798 
Conclusion ................................................................................................ 1799 
Introduction 
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(“HIPAA”) contains strict privacy provisions that protect individually 
identifiable health information. In general, the provisions prevent release 
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of information to anyone other than the patient or the patient’s personal 
representative without explicit consent from the individual patient.1 
Many state privacy laws do the same,2 also mandating notice about these 
information disclosure regulations to an individual being held under an 
involuntary psychiatric hold.3 HIPAA’s default restriction against release 
of patient information acts as a barrier to family caregivers4 receiving 
information about their loved one during an involuntary psychiatric hold. 
In many instances this barrier to sharing poses a serious problem to 
individuals’ long-term health and to the family caregivers’ involvement in 
their care.5 
Family caregivers are often left uninformed of either the details of 
their family member’s diagnosis or symptoms,6 as well as the details of 
treatments available or under consideration.7 Further, HIPAA’s Privacy 
Rule (“Privacy Rule”) often prevents family caregivers from even 
knowing if a hospital is involuntarily holding their family member.8 
 
 1. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2014); see also U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Office for Rights, 
Sharing Health Information with Family and Friends, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/ 
understanding/consumers/sharing-family-friends.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2015). Individual 
psychotherapy notes are even harder on which to receive information. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.508 (2014). 
 2. This Note will not discuss state privacy law in detail. See infra note 55. 
 3. See, e.g., Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 5150(f)(1), (h)(1) (West 2014) (requiring the provision 
of information about the basis for the hold, the individual’s rights, and the basic contours of the hold); 
see also Patient Self-Determination Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc(f)(1)(A)(i) (West 2011) (requiring disclosure 
of rights and policies of providers that receive Medicaid or Medicare funding). Here, there is a 
mandated effort to give individual information on which to base subsequent medical decisions, even 
under circumstances calling into question their ability to make those decisions. 
 4. “Family caregiver” or “family caretaker” is used throughout the Note to also include close 
friends and adults who exhibit special care and concern for the patient. Similarly, “family member” or 
“loved one” will be used to include those close friends and adults who are the subject of that special 
care and concern. This reflects an inclusive definition of family that has been accepted by many state 
legislatures and the Uniform Law Commissioners. See infra Part III.B. 
 5. Tell Your Representative That HIPAA Hurts People with Severe Mental Illness, Treatment Advoc. 
Center (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/about-us/our-blog/69-no-state/2299-
tell-your-representative-that-hipaa-hurts-people-with-severe-mental-illness. 
 6. In many state jurisdictions, some information can be released by the treatment provider under 
a “duty to warn” if an individual has stated an intention to harm another. See Tarasoff v. Regents of 
Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976); see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(j) (2014) (permitting covered 
entities to release PHI over patient’s objection “to avert a serious threat to health or safety”). This 
Note proposes release of more information to specified caregivers for the long-term treatment of the 
individual, independent of any threats to those caregivers. 
 7. Mother Sues Son for Access to Medical Records, Treatment Advoc. Center (Oct. 2, 2013), 
http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/about-us/our-blog/128 (“The Treatment Advocacy Center 
routinely receives phone calls from patients and family members frustrated that privacy laws prevent them 
from helping desperately ill loved ones get appropriate treatment and keep them from being aware of 
safety issues.”). 
 8. Caregivers can still offer information to the health care provider. See HIPAA at a Glance, 
Treatment Advoc. Center, http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/component/content/article/1850 
(last visited Aug. 5, 2015); see also HIPAA Privacy Rule and Sharing Information Related to Mental Health, 
U.S. Department Health & Hum. Services,  http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/ 
special/mhguidance.html (last visited August 5, 2015) (“HIPAA in no way prevents health care providers 
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Furthermore, when an individual is involuntarily held9 for meeting 
certain criteria stemming from mental illness,10 the effects of her mental 
illness on her ability to make well-considered and wise decisions in her 
own best interests11 often prevent her from consenting to release of the 
health information, or even undergoing treatment because of an inability 
to recognize the existence of the illness.12 This Note will explore this 
problem and propose changes to both the Privacy Rule and its 
implementation in order to more effectively address the challenges faced 
by patients, families, and American society.13 
This Note will also explore the problem created by the Privacy 
Rule’s prevention of release of information to an individual’s family 
member when the individual is held on an involuntary psychiatric hold. It 
will discuss current doctrines and rationales in the context of health care 
decisionmaking. 
Finally, this Note will propose several solutions to the problem. The 
first proposal calls for instituting a college HIPAA waiver process that 
designates a family caregiver to receive notice when a family member is 
 
from listening to family members or other caregivers who may have concerns about the health and well-being 
of the patient . . . .”). 
 9. The term “involuntary psychiatric hold” comes from many state statutes that provide for the 
hospitalization and monitoring of an individual for a short period of time under certain conditions. 
See, e.g., Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5150 (West 2014). The purpose of such holds is to “determine 
whether the person is in such mental condition as to justify the state in depriving him of his personal 
liberty and affording him, if it is found needed, benefit of proper care and remedial aid.” Hsu v. Mt. 
Zion Hosp., 66 Cal. Rptr. 659, 664 (Ct. App. 1968) (emphasis added). 
 10. When the term “mental illness” has been used in federal legislation, it traditionally has been 
interpreted to include all disorders in the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. See Marcia C. Peck & Richard M. Scheffler, An Analysis of the 
Definitions of Mental Illness Used in State Parity Laws, 53 Psychiatric Services 1089, 1090 (2002). 
 11. The Anatomical Basis of Anosognosia (Lack of Awareness of Illness), Treatment Advoc. 
Center (May 2013), http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/Research/anosognosia_ 
backgrounder_may_2013.pdf. 
 12. Xavier F. Amador & Andrew A. Shiva, Insight into Schizophrenia: Anosognosia, 
Competency, and Civil Liberties, 11 Geo. Mason U. C.R. L.J. 25, 28 (2000) (“Poor insight in 
schizophrenia bears remarkable similarities to anosognosia in neurological disorders. Patients with 
schizophrenia who have poor insight, and neurological disorder patients with anosognosia, exhibit the 
following characteristics: a very severe lack of awareness of their illness, the belief persisting despite 
conflicting evidence, confabulations to explain the observations that contradict their belief that they 
are not ill, and a compulsion to prove their self-concept.”). 
 13. The Author would like to emphasize that mental illnesses, including serious mental illnesses, 
are more treatable now than ever before. Recovery is possible and has been the subject of major 
movies and popular culture. See, e.g., Steve Lopez, Checking in with Nathaniel Ayers, L.A. Times (Oct. 
11, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-1012-lopez-nateupdate-20141011-column.html (providing 
update on Nathaniel Ayers, who columnist, Steve Lopez, has known for ten years); The Soloist 
(DreamWorks Pictures 2009) (detailing the experiences of Nathaniel Ayers, Julliard-trained bassist). See 
also Nicole Mulvaney, ‘A Beautiful Mind’ Mathematician at Princeton University Awarded $800k Abel 
Prize, NJ.com (Mar. 25, 2015 6:05 PM), http://www.nj.com/mercer/index.ssf/2015/03/ 
a_beautiful_mind_princeton_university_mathematicia.html (exploring the life of the late John Nash, 
Noble Laureate in Economics); A Beautiful Mind (Universal Pictures 2001). Some accomplish the 
extraordinary. Many contribute to society. All create meaningful lives. 
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admitted to an involuntary psychiatric hold.14 Second, this Note proposes 
recognizing “family caregivers” to be defined broadly to include 
individuals not related by blood or marriage as part of the potential 
treatment team. Finally, this Note suggests recognizing family caregivers 
as personal representatives within the language of the HIPAA statute, 
and thus affording them access to the individual’s protected health 
information (“PHI”).15  
Part I will discuss the current Privacy Rule and its effect on the 
release of information during involuntary psychiatric holds. Part II will 
discuss providers’ incentives to withhold information, even when release 
is permitted under the Privacy Rule. Part III will discuss principles, 
doctrines, and statutory schemes underlying health care decisionmaking 
generally, and the decision to release health information specifically. Part 
IV will discuss possible solutions consistent with those general health 
care decisionmaking principles. 
I.  The Privacy Rule in a Nutshell 
Congress passed HIPAA in 1996, and the Act’s Privacy Rule took 
effect in 2003.16 Congress then made amendments to HIPAA in the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009,17 and added the final 
HIPAA amendments in 2013.18 The Department of Health and Human 
Services (“DHHS”) has statutory authority to promulgate regulations 
under the Privacy Rule19 and is responsible for enforcing the Privacy 
Rule.20 In the Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health 
Information, DHHS provides: 
 
 14. The proposal only affects adults eighteen years and older because before then, adult caretakers 
such as parents or guardians of an individual generally have access to their health information. 
 15. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2014). 
 16. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 
110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 17. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.). 
 18. Modifications to HIPAA Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566 (Jan. 25, 2013). 
 19. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164.102–106 &164.500–534. 
 20. HIPAA Enforcement, U.S. Dep’t. of Health & Hum. Servs., http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/ 
hipaa/enforcement/index.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2015). 
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This regulation has three major purposes: (1) To protect and enhance 
the rights of consumers by providing them access to their health 
information and controlling the inappropriate use of that information; 
(2) to improve the quality of health care in the United States by 
restoring trust in the health care system among consumers, health care 
professionals, and the multitude of organizations and individuals 
committed to the delivery of care; and (3) to improve the efficiency 
and effectiveness of health care delivery by creating a national 
framework for health privacy protection that builds on efforts by 
states, health systems, and individual organizations and individuals.21 
Expert commentators note that the Privacy Rule establishes “a set 
of basic national privacy standards and fair information practices that 
provides all Americans with a basic level of protection and peace of mind 
that is essential to their full participation in their care” and a “floor of 
ground rules for health care providers . . . to follow, in order to protect 
patients and encourage them to seek needed care.”22 Thus, a key 
rationale underlying the Privacy Rule is that it will encourage individuals 
to seek health care when they are sick (and know that they have an 
illness23) because they will be confident that their private medical 
information will be kept private. Generally, that is a strong normative 
argument in favor of the Privacy Rule and its robust protections. The 
ability of the Privacy Rule to effectuate peace of mind to encourage 
people to seek care relies upon the individual having a subjective 
understanding that they have an illness. Without that understanding, 
there is no motivation to seek treatment, regardless of the Privacy Rule’s 
existence. People who suffer from serious mental illness,24 but lack 
understanding of their illness, will not seek treatment.25 This is especially 
true under an involuntary psychiatric hold, where the individual often 
 
 21. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82462, 
82463 (Dec. 28, 2000). 
 22. Barry Furrow et al., Health Law: Cases, Materials, and Problems 268 (2013). 
 23. One court that defined the “plain and ordinary meaning” of the term “illness” defined it as 
“any abnormal condition of the body or its components of such a degree that in its natural progression 
would be expected to be problematic; a deviation from the healthy or normal state affecting the 
functions or tissues of the body; an inherent defect of the body; or a morbid physical or mental state 
which deviates from or interrupts the normal structure or function of any part, organ, or system of the 
body and which is manifested by a characteristic set of symptoms and signs.” Katskee v. Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield of Neb., 515 N.W.2d 645, 651 (Neb. 1994).  
 24. This Note adheres to “people-first” language terminology used to describe conditions 
accurately and not increase stigma against people suffering from such illnesses. See John Parry & Eric 
Y. Drogin, Mental Disability Law, Evidence and Testimony: A Comprehensive Reference 
Manual for Lawyers, Judges and Mental Disability Professionals 4953 (A.B.A. 2007); see also 
Carey Goldberg, A Phrase to Renounce for 2014: ‘The Mentally Ill’, WBUR’s CommonHealth (Jan. 3, 
2014, 1:57 PM), http://commonhealth.wbur.org/2014/01/renounce-term-the-mentally-ill (showing the 
highly influential Associated Press style guide adopting the position with a “new entry on mental 
illness [that] says to refer to people ‘diagnosed with schizophrenia instead of schizophrenics’”). 
 25. Ronald C. Kessler et al., The Prevalence and Correlates of Untreated Serious Mental Illness, 
36 Hum. Services Res. 987, 1000 (Dec. 2001) (“[T]he majority of untreated people with SMI do not 
believe that they have emotional problems that require treatment.”).  
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did not seek out the treatment in the first instance. In these cases, the 
Privacy Rule does not and cannot achieve that purpose of encouraging 
people to seek health care. As a countervailing consideration, the Privacy 
Rule also attempts to balance public responsibility with privacy 
protections.26 This Note takes the position that in the area of involuntary 
psychiatric holds, providers have shifted the balance too far away from 
public responsibility by preventing release of information when a family 
member is on an involuntary hold. 
A. The Privacy Rule Currently Allows Health Care Providers to 
Deny Release of Information to Family Caretakers When a 
Family Member Is on a Psychiatric Hold 
HIPAA and the Privacy Rule create problems in the context of 
mental illness because they were not “written with mental illness in mind.”27 
This oversight results in serious problems when HIPAA inevitably impacts 
the rights and treatment of individuals suffering from mental illness.  
Even in the face of the long-standing stigma surrounding mental 
illness, the national conversation on mental health, illness, and treatment 
continues to expand.28 Advocates have coalesced and organizations have 
formed in order to fight against and change the existing societal stigmas 
against mental illness.29 President Barack Obama remarked during his 
2015 State of the Union Address, “we’re a people who value the dignity 
and worth of every citizen . . . [including] Americans with mental illness 
or physical disability. Everybody matters.”30 The national conversation 
reflects a greater awareness of mental illness, as serious mental illnesses 
 
 26. Furrow et al., supra note 22, at 278; see also HIPAA Privacy Rule and Sharing Information, 
supra note 8, at 1 (“At the same time, the Privacy Rule recognizes circumstances arise where health 
information may need to be shared to ensure the patient receives the best treatment and for other 
important purposes, such as for the health and safety of the patient or others.”). 
 27. Jenny Gold, Privacy Law Frustrates Parents of Mentally Ill Adult Children, NPR (June 4, 
2014, 4:41 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2014/06/04/318765929/privacy-law-frustrates-parents-of-
mentally-ill-adult-children.  
 28. President Obama Opens White House Mental Health Conference, C-SPAN (June 3, 2013), 
http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/313109-1; Untreated Mental Illness an Imminent Danger?, CBS News 
(Sept. 29, 2013, 7:00 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/videos/untreated-mental-illness-an-imminent-danger; see 
also Nicholas Kristof, First Up, Mental Illness. Next Topic Is Up to You, N.Y. Times (Jan. 4, 2004), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/05/opinion/sunday/kristof-first-up-mental-illness-next-topic-is-up-to-
you.html. 
 29. See Bring Change 2 Mind, www.bringchange2mind.org (last visited Aug. 5, 2015); Fight Stigma: 
Become a StigmaBuster!, Nat’l Alliance on Mental Illness, http://www.nami.org/Content/ 
NavigationMenu/Take_Action/Fight_Stigma/Fight_Stigma_StigmaBusters.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2015); 
Project 375, http://project375.org (last visited Aug. 5, 2015); Mental Health Program, Carter Center, 
http://www.cartercenter.org/health/mental_health/index.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2015). 
 30. President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2015), transcript available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/20/remarks-president-state-union-address-january-
20-2015. 
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affect a large portion of the populationone in seventeen people.31 Some 
of these illnesses, including major depression, bipolar disorder, 
schizophrenia, and obsessive-compulsive disorder, are incredibly 
debilitating and dangerous, and in some instances, lead to suicide and 
higher rates of morbidity.32 As attention and funding are brought to bear 
on services for mental illness, the involvement of the family members 
and loved ones who provide caregiving and support remains an integral 
aspect of the treatment process for people with mental illness.33 One 
critical component of involving family caregivers in an individual’s 
treatment is the information regarding the patient’s diagnosis, prognosis, 
and treatment plans.34 The Privacy Rule’s current “authorization” 
 
 31. Serious Mental Illness (SMI) Among U.S. Adults, Nat’l Inst. Mental Health, 
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/prevalence/serious-mental-illness-smi-among-us-adults.shtml 
(estimating 9.6 million Americans, or 4.1% of population, have serious mental illness). The statistics 
also acknowledge that people with serious mental illness are disproportionately less likely to answer 
the survey, suggesting the prevalence is higher. Id. See also Press Release, World Health Org., Mental 
Disorders Affect One in Four People (Oct. 2001), available at http://www.who.int/whr/2001/media_ 
centre/press_release/en/ (finding 450 million people worldwide suffer from a mental disorder). 
 32. See General Mental Illness, Brain & Behav. Res. Found., https://bbrfoundation.org/mental-
illness-1 (noting the four diagnoses are amongst ten “leading causes of disability identified and tracked 
in the United States and other developed countries”); Elizabeth Resinger et al., Mortality in Mental 
Disorders and Global Disease Burden Implication: A Systemic Review and Meta-Analysis, 72 JAMA 
Psychiatry 334 (Feb. 11, 2015), http://archpsyc.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=2110027 (finding 
“median years of potential life lost was 10 years” and concluding “estimates suggest that mental 
disorders rank among the most substantial causes of death worldwide”); Depression Facts and Statistics, 
Depression Perception, http://www.depressionperception.com/depression/depression-facts-and-
statistics.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2015). 
 33. Ian R.H. Falloon, Family Interventions for Mental Disorders: Efficacy and Effectiveness, 
World Psychiatry (Feb. 2003), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1525058 (“There is sufficient 
scientific evidence to conclude that strategies that enhance the caregiving capacity of family members 
and other people involved in the day to day care for people with mental disorders have a clinically 
significant impact on the course of major mental disorders.”). A second interwoven rationale allows 
PHI disclosure to stem from family members’ desire to have information regarding where the individual 
is, when they may not know, and to promote reunification. See, e.g., Accusations of Patient Dumping, 
ABC News (May 2, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/video/accusations-patient-dumping-19096538 
(showing James Brown suffering from severe mental illness, discharged from state hospital, and sent 
out of state). Later, social workers helped contact Brown’s daughter, which led to reunification. See 
Cynthia Hubert, Mentally Ill Man ‘Dumped’ by Nevada Has Happy Reunion with Daughter, Sacramento 
Bee (Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.sacbee.com/2013/04/12/5336162/mentally-ill-man-dumped-by-nevada.html 
(describing his daughter’s lack of knowledge of Brown’s whereabouts, their reunification, and 
subsequent treatment plans and accommodations). Other stories drag on longer or do not end so 
happily. See Ryan Lavis, Mental Illness and Missing Adults: Experts and Family Members Say the Law 
Hinders Search Efforts for Loved Ones, SILive.com (May 4, 2014, 8:16 PM), 
http://www.silive.com/news/index.ssf/2014/05/mentel_illness_and_missing_adu.html (“When a family is 
trying to look for them, they can call every hospital in the area, but they can’t even tell them if their family 
member is there—it’s a big problem.”). 
 34. See, e.g., Anthony F. Lehman et al., At Issue: Translating Research into Practice: The 
Schizophrenia Patient Outcomes Research Team (PORT) Treatment Recommendations, 24 Schizophrenia 
Bulletin 1, 8 (1998) (“Randomized clinical trials have repeatedly demonstrated that family interventions 
that provide some combination of illness education, support, problem-solving training, and crisis 
intervention, in combination with appropriate pharmacotherapy, reduce 1-year relapse rates from a 40 
to 53 percent range to a 2 to 23 percent range.”). 
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requirement stands as one significant barrier to the critical component of 
caregiver involvement. 
The Privacy Rule currently requires “authorization” before a 
“covered entity” can release medical information about a particular 
patient to another party.35 A “covered entity” is any health care plan or 
provider that transmits health information in electronic form.36 In the 
case of individuals suffering from a severe psychotic episode37 or other 
event that necessitates short-term involuntary commitment, the Privacy 
Rule’s prerelease authorization requirement is problematic because it 
presupposes the capacity to make such an authorization that many might 
lack during this time. Although there is one such exception for sharing 
information under the Privacy Rule, it is complicated, left to the 
discretion of the health care provider, and importantly, rarely actually 
used in practice.38 
This Note discusses how to fix the exception for sharing information 
in order to better serve the interests of the patient. One possible way to 
circumvent the exception’s current barriers is to categorize the disclosure 
of the patient’s treatment under involuntary psychiatric hold orders to a 
known family caregiver as a form of “treatment” under HIPAA.39 Thus, 
explicit authorization during an illness would no longer be required in 
certain circumstances, and family caregivers’ role in the long-term 
treatment of their loved ones would be formally recognized in the 
Privacy Rule.40 Another solution this Note explores is to amend the 
Privacy Rule to include designated family caregivers as “personal 
representatives,”41 who, under HIPAA, would be entitled to receive the 
 
 35. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2014). 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Psychosis, MedlinePlus Medical Encyclopedia, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ 
ency/article/001553.htm (defining psychosis as a “los[s of] contact with reality,” which usually includes, 
“[having] false beliefs about what is taking place or who one is (delusions)” and “see[ing] or hear[ing] things 
that aren’t there (hallucinations)” and disorganized thought and speech). 
 38. Tim Murphy, The Helping Families in Mental Health Crisis Act, http://murphy.house.gov/ 
uploads/Summary.pdf (finding lack of information sharing “because of complicated federal rules on 
communicating with immediate family members and caregivers”). Congressman Murphy’s bill also 
includes important policy changes to increase inpatient psychiatric beds, to increase rural and underserved 
area access to psychologists and psychiatrists, to ensure NIMH money and federal grants are directed 
towards evidence-based care, to guarantee Medicare and Medicaid coverage for psychiatric drugs, to 
support NIMH research, and to support reauthorization of mental health courts and training for law 
enforcement officers that interact with people going through acute psychiatric crisis. Id.; see also 
HIPAA at a Glance, supra note 8. 
 39. The Privacy Rule defines treatment as “the provision, coordination, or management of health 
care and related services by one or more health care providers, including the coordination or 
management of health care by a health care provider with a third party.” 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2014). 
The Privacy Rule permits use or disclosure of PHI for a covered entity’s own treatment purposes, or 
the treatment activities of a health care provider. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(c)(1)–(2) (2014). 
 40. See infra Part IV.B. 
 41. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(g)(1) (2014). 
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patient’s individually identifiable health information on her behalf.42 Yet 
another possible approach is to institute a “psychiatric advance 
directive”43 during college and post-secondary education enrollment—
when many mental illnesses first emerge.44 Such a directive would 
specifically authorize information sharing, particularly during a future 
acute psychiatric crisis.45 These implementations would provide clearer, 
more effective guidance for when information should be released, and 
would more definitively advance individual and family interests. 
B. The Privacy Rule Currently Mandates “Incapacity” to Allow 
Disclosure of Protected Health Information to Family 
Caregivers 
A slight exception to the stringent Privacy Rule currently exists for 
limited emergency circumstances. Where a patient is considered “not 
present” due to “incapacity or an emergency situation, the Privacy Rule 
permits disclosures that the provider considers to be in the best interest 
of the patient, but limits the information to that which is directly relevant 
to the person’s involvement in the patient’s health care.”46 With this 
exception, the Privacy Rule contemplates the situation where an 
individual is involuntarily held, and allows for flexibility “in the best 
interests” of the patient.47 This shows that the Privacy Rule’s intent is not 
to completely prevent the flow of information from the provider to 
family caregivers about an individual’s health during such a critical 
period,48 but rather to limit release to cases where the physician 
concludes in her professional judgment that it is in the patient’s best 
interest. 
However, the current exception has two clear shortcomings. First, it 
is unclear and obscure, providing no guidance as to the exception’s policy 
rationale for providers.49 Second, the release of information is only 
 
 42. See infra Part IV.C.  
 43. See infra Part III.C.  
 44. Press Release, Nat’l Inst. Mental Health, Mental Illness Exacts Heavy Toll, Beginning in 
Youth (June 6, 2005), available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/news/science-news/2005/mental-illness-exacts-
heavy-toll-beginning-in-youth.shtml (“Half of all lifetime cases begin by age 14; three quarters have 
begun by age 24. Thus, mental disorders are really the chronic diseases of the young.”). 
 45. See infra Part IV.A.  
 46. Richard C. Boldt, Adolescent Decisionmaking: Legal Issues with Respect to Treatment for 
Substance Misuse and Mental Illness, 15 J. Health Care L. & Pol’y 75, 113 n.265 (2012); see also 
45 C.F.R. § 164.510(b)(3) (2014); HIPAA Privacy Rule and Sharing Information, supra note 8. 
 47. This Note will discuss the “best interests” doctrine. See infra Part III. 
 48. U.S. Dep’t. of Health & Hum. Servs., Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule (2003), 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/summary/privacysummary.pdf (stating the main 
purpose of the HIPAA Privacy Rule is to define and limit when the PHI of an individual may be used or 
disclosed by covered entities). 
 49. Adolescent Decisionmaking, supra note 46; see also Furrow et al., supra note 22, at 277 
(“Nurses can speak over the phone with a patient or family member about the patient’s condition.”). 
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permitted, not required.50 Because this release exception is unclear and 
only permissive, health care providers do not, as a matter of hospital 
policy, release PHI to the individual’s family without express written 
consent.51 A key question is: Why? 
II.  Health Care Providers Have Incentives to Not Permit 
Disclosure, Even When They Can 
Health care providers might not permit disclosure of protected 
health information for various reasons including liability, ambiguity of 
liability, and financial and administrative costs. A provider may likely 
enact a blanket policy of nondisclosure to avoid possible penalization by 
the Office of Civil Rights of the DHHS (“OCR”).52 But the OCR does 
not explicitly preclude a hospital representative from speaking over the 
phone with a family member about the patient’s condition, and the 
release of such information is authorized in circumstances where the 
physician deems it in the best interest of the patient.53 By adopting a 
nondisclosure policy, providers are acting with an overabundance of 
caution to the detriment of the patient. This excessive caution is 
unwarranted given HIPAA’s history of not penalizing covered entities 
who violate the Privacy Rule.54 Alternatively, the health care provider 
may also be attempting to avoid violation of state confidentiality laws.55 
 
 50. Office for Civil Rights, A Health Care Provider’s Guide to the HIPAA Privacy Rule: 
Communicating with a Patient’s Family, Friends, or Others Involved in the Patient’s Care 2, 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentities/provider_ffg.pdf (last visited Aug. 
5, 2015); see also HIPAA Privacy Rule and Sharing Information, supra note 8, at n.1 (“The Privacy 
Rule permits, but does not require, providers to disclose information in these situations. Providers who 
are subject to more stringent privacy standards under other laws, such as certain state confidentiality laws or 
42 C.F.R. Part 2, would need to consider whether there is a similar disclosure permission under those 
laws that would apply in the circumstances.”). 
 51. How HIPAA Prevents Seriously Mentally Ill From Getting Good Care and What to Do About 
It, Mental Illness Pol’y Org., http://mentalillnesspolicy.org/national-studies/HIPAA_handcuffs.pdf 
(“covered entities default to nondisclosure”); see also Pete Earley, HIPAA: Does it Keep Key Information 
From Family Members, Pete Earley Blog (May 17, 2013), http://www.peteearley.com/2013/05/17/ 
hipaa-does-it-keep-key-information-from-family-members/ (detailing one family’s experience being 
repeatedly denied any information about their son on the basis of HIPAA, even at one point with 
written consent from their son). 
 52. Furrow et al., supra note 22, at 28081. 
 53. See HIPAA Privacy Rule and Sharing Information, supra note 8. 
 54. Does HIPAA Help or Hinder Patient Care And Public Safety?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce H.R., 113th Cong. 33 (2013) 
(statement of Leon Rodriguez, Director, Office of Civil Rights, Department of Health and Human 
Services) (“We have received 80,000 complaints since we began enforcing. Only 12 of them have 
resulted in monetary penalties.”).  
 55. See HIPAA Privacy Rule and Sharing Information, supra note 8. The Privacy Rule only 
preempts state confidentiality laws that are directly contrary to it. How Do Other Privacy Protections 
Interact with the Privacy Rule?, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., http://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/ 
pr_05.asp (last updated Feb. 2, 2007). To the extent state privacy laws may more stringently prohibit 
disclosure, this Note advises that states revise their privacy law consistent with this Note’s suggestions 
for HIPAA. 
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Whatever the statutory concern, it appears that many health care 
providers have enacted a “prophylactic” policy56 against releasing an 
individual’s mental health information to family caretakers.57 
Another possible rationale driving health care providers’ blanket 
nondisclosure policies is their misinterpretation that HIPAA prevents 
the dissemination of such information without consent in all 
circumstances.58 In fact, OCR had to issue an open letter to the nation’s 
health care providers on this point, clarifying that HIPAA’s “Privacy 
Rule does not prevent [their] ability to disclose necessary information 
about a patient to law enforcement, family members of the patient, or 
other persons, when [they] believe the patient presents a serious danger 
to himself or other people.”59 Furthermore, OCR clarified that the 
Privacy Rule offers the provider protection in her dissemination of the 
patient’s information.60 The Privacy Rule establishes that “the provider is 
presumed to have had a good faith belief when his or her belief is based 
upon the provider’s actual knowledge . . . or in reliance on a credible 
representation by a person with apparent knowledge or authority . . . .”61 
OCR’s letter referencing these provisions exemplifies the widespread 
“misunderstanding” of the application of the Privacy Rule62 and 
highlights the primacy that federal privacy law takes, superseding state 
privacy law when HIPAA is more restrictive than the state law.63 While 
OCR’s statement suggests that DHHS recognizes the misunderstanding 
about the nature of HIPAA, this statement solely seeks to clarify 
Tarasoff-like “duty to warn” requirements and protection for health care 
providers’ disclosures that apply only in limited cases when there is a 
 
 56. The Supreme Court has used the term “prophylactic” to describe cautious measures used to 
insure other rights are protected, such as the Miranda doctrine’s prophylactic protection of the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984). As 
this Part and Note points out, however, such prophylaxis is inconsistent with the Privacy Rule itself. 
 57. See How HIPAA Prevents, supra note 51 (“[C]overed entities default to nondisclosure”). 
 58. Id. (suggesting this is sometimes done “out of ignorance of the law”). 
 59. Letter from Leon Rodriguez, Director, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. 
Servs., to Our Nation’s Health Care Providers (Jan. 15, 2013), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ 
ocr/office/lettertonationhcp.pdf. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(j) (2014). 
 62. See HIPAA Privacy Rule and Sharing Information, supra note 8, at 6 (reiterating that the 
“Privacy Rule permits a health care provider to disclose necessary information about a patient to law 
enforcement, family members of the patient, or other persons, when the provider believes the patient 
presents a serious and imminent threat to self or others”). OCR also reiterated the exception for 
disclosure to family caregivers in light of the Ebola outbreak and other events. See also Bulletin: 
HIPAA Privacy in Emergency Situations, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. 
Servs., (Nov. 2014), http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/special/emergency/emergenc
ysituations.pdf. 
 63. HIPAA Privacy Rule and Sharing Information, supra note 8, at 9 (“[M]ost states have laws 
and/or court decisions which address, and in many instances require, disclosure of patient information 
to prevent or lessen the risk of harm.”). 
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serious danger to other persons.64 Such a statement only clarifies existing 
“duty to warn” obligations and does not clarify or highlight the family 
caregiver exception. 
This OCR message also exemplifies another probable reason for the 
“prophylactic” policy: the confusion that many providers experience 
about what and when they can share with certain people without the 
express consent of the patient.65 Often, when an actor (here, the health 
care provider) is unclear about where the law draws the line, she will 
generally stay far away from the line so as to avoid violating the law and 
incurring penalties.66 To a certain extent, that decision may reflect astute 
advice from the provider’s legal counsel in an attempt to protect the 
provider in the face of ambiguous liability. While in some contexts 
ambiguity may create desirable deterrence from action, in this area, it is 
in the American public’s best interest for health care providers to both 
comply with the law and provide the highest quality of care possible. It is 
essential then that the lawmakers clarify the law in this area. In response 
to the lack of understanding by health care providers of the Privacy 
Rule’s treatment of PHI disclosure for family caretakers in this context, 
DHHS recently released further guidance aimed at clarifying when it is 
appropriate for a health care provider to share the PHI of a patient who 
is being treated for a mental health condition.67 The guidance directly 
clarifies, again, that the provider can, if the individual currently lacks 
capacity, share information with the family member without the patient’s 
consent if the provider believes it is in the best interest of the patient.68 
 
 64. See supra note 6. 
 65. See, e.g., Chris Vanderveen, Family’s Tragedy Could Shed Light on Privacy Laws, 9news 
(Feb. 9, 2015), http://ux.9news.com/longform/news/investigations/2015/02/09/ari-liggett-hipaa/23136843 
(quoting sister of man who killed mother stating that the “doctor testified at trial that, because of Ari’s 
rights and because of HIPAA laws, she was legally obligated to ignore my mom’s phone calls”); see 
also Privacy Law Frustrates Parents, supra note 27 (“[P]roblems include plain misunderstanding about 
what the law requires and allows.”). 
 66. HIPAA: What’s Smoke, What’s Fire?Personally Speaking, Treatment Advoc. Center (Apr. 
26, 2013), http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/about-us/our-blog/69-no-state/2300 (“[W]itnesses all 
agreed that medical providers typically want to talk to family members but don’t because they feel 
their lips are sealed by Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule 
and fear punishment.”); Privacy Law Frustrates Parents, supra note 27 (suggesting providers “are 
afraid of being sued”). 
 67. See HIPAA Privacy Rule and Sharing Information, supra note 8. 
 68. The relevant portion reads in part: 
If, for example, the provider believes the patient cannot meaningfully agree or object to the 
sharing of the patient’s information with family, friends, or other persons involved in their 
care due to her current mental state, the provider is allowed to discuss the patient’s 
condition or treatment with a family member, if the provider believes it would be in the 
patient’s best interests. In making this determination about the patient’s best interests, the 
provider should take into account the patient’s prior expressed preferences regarding 
disclosures of their information, if any, as well as the circumstances of the current situation.  
Id. 
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A separate interest that the current health care provider default of 
nondisclosure serves in this case is the patient’s privacy interest. While 
important, that interest is not absolute and should be balanced with the 
need for coordinated treatment while a patient experiences a severe 
illness. This privacy interest is still preserved by the fact that the 
proposed disclosure of the information will be limited only to family 
caregivers. There is, generally speaking, less of a privacy intrusion in 
disclosure to family caregivers than disclosure to say, one’s employer,69 
because the “family unit” necessarily includes relationships of trust that 
very often do not exist in other circumstances.70 
Yet another interest at work here is that of saving the provider time 
and money that often comes at the expense of the long-term health and 
well-being of the patient.71 For the provider, more contact with more 
people results in increased paperwork and staff time. Providers would 
have to either pass such extra costs through their existing financing 
structure, making the providers’ services less attractive to their 
purchasers, or “eat” the cost from existing budgets. The prophylaxis also 
arguably serves the providers’ related interests in administrative 
convenience. It takes up less time and energy from busy hospital staff if 
they do not have to deal with families and caregivers over the phone or 
in person when policy or law does not require it.72 That rationale, again, 
puts provider interests in “avoiding hassle” above the best interests of 
the patient. 
Despite attempts by OCR to clarify the HIPAA information sharing 
provision, the permissive nature of the provision giving providers the 
ability to withhold information stands as an obstacle to serving the best 
interests of the patient, and inhibits its uniform application by health care 
providers across the nation. Health care providers still have a big 
incentive to not “go through all the hassle” of providing as much 
information as may be permitted by law, even if communication with the 
family caregiver is in the best interests of the patient’s long-term 
treatment. The fear and uncertainty of civil penalties, administrative 
costs associated with the increased transactional costs of disseminating 
information, and general institutional inertia73 all stand as formidable 
 
 69. There may be circumstances when such trust does not exist between certain traditional family 
members. See infra Part IV.D.2. This Note uses “family caregiver” and “family caretaker” to describe 
individuals who exhibit special care and concern for one another and not solely individuals related by 
blood or law.  
 70. Again, “family unit” here is more inclusively defined to include close friends and adults that 
the individual has to chosen to include as “family” in their life. 
 71. How HIPAA Prevents Seriously Mentally Ill, supra note 51 (“[I]t serves the purposes of the 
individual [health care provider] or organization”). 
 72. Privacy Law Frustrates Parents, supra note 27 (“[P]roviders may be ‘hiding behind HIPAA,’ 
so that they don’t have to deal with families . . . .”). 
 73. “Institutions tend to be sticky—once in place and accepted, they can limit policy change and 
future choices.” Overcoming Behavioral and Institutional Inertia, in World Dev. Rep. 321 (2010), 
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barriers to the implementation of a policy of standard dissemination of 
PHI on an involuntary psychiatric hold to family caretakers. Despite 
OCR’s clarifications, a solution that incorporates a required disclosure is 
still needed to promote compliance by the nation’s health care providers. 
III.  Competency, Decisional Capacity, and the Decision to 
Release Information 
When evaluating the decision to release medical information, it is 
important to first understand the legal framework of how individual 
patients generally make health care decisions. This Part examines the 
legal principles that guide who has decisionmaking authority for patients’ 
health care, and how they exercise that authority. 
According to long-established common law principles, an 
individual’s competency to make medical decisions is presumed.74 State 
statutory law has widely incorporated and codified this common law 
principle, presuming that people are competent to make medical 
decisions, including the decision to release medical information.75 
The legal concept of decisional capacity, or the ability to make 
decisions with regard to medical care, has been the subject of 
considerable and long-standing debate.76 The current understanding of 
decisional capacity examines whether an individual has: “(1) possession 
of a set of values and goals, (2) the ability to communicate and 
understand information, and (3) the ability to reason and deliberate 
about one’s choices.”77 Physicians will often make assessments by asking 
the patient to make a choice regarding treatment, encouraging the 
patient to repeat information about the medical condition and treatment, 




 74. Grannum v. Berard, 422 P.2d 812, 814 (Wash. 1967) (“It is well settled that the law will 
presume sanity rather than insanity, competency rather than incompetency . . . .”). 
 75. Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act § 11 (1993) (consolidating various state laws related to 
health care decisionmaking).  
 76. Furrow et al., supra note 22, at 1579 (“Courts have been much more likely to finesse the 
issue out of the law and back into medicine . . . Ironically, medical textbooks point out that the 
standard for capacity is a legal, not a medical one.”); see also Robert Miller, The Continuum of 
Coercion: Constitutional and Clinical Considerations in the Treatment of Mentally Disordered Persons, 
74 Denv. U. L. Rev. 1169, 1198 (“Mental health and legal professionals have often differed in their 
interpretations of the capacity issue.”). 
 77. President’s Comm’n for the Study of Ethical Problems in Med. & Biomedical & 
Behavioral Research, 1 Making Health Care Decisions: A Report on the Ethical and Legal 
Implications of Informed Consent in the Patient-Practitioner Relationship 5760 (1982). Dr. Paul 
Appelbaum alternatively describes the legal standard as generally embodying four criteria: “[A]bilit[y] to 
communicate a choice, to understand the relevant information, to appreciate the medical consequences 
of the situation, and to reason about treatment choices.” Paul S. Appelbaum, Assessment of Patients’ 
Competence to Consent to Treatment, 357 New Eng. J. Med. 1834, 1835 (2007). 
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treatment options and consequences to offer reasons for their selection.78 
In an early and influential article, the authors, Loren Roth, Alan Meisel, 
and Charles Lidz analyzed various tests for competency and concluded 
that testing competency to consent to treatment (a previous incarnation 
to decisional capacity) operated as a sort of “sliding scale” in practice.79 
Under this sliding scale, if the benefit of treatment was likely to far 
outweigh the risks, there was a low standard of competency when the 
patient consented, and a high standard for competency when the patient 
refused—and vice versa.80 In more recent scholarship, Dr. Paul 
Appelbaum highlights that the “stringency of the test applied varies 
directly with the seriousness of the likely consequences of patients’ 
decisions,” a continuation of the sliding scale approach in practice.81 
Arguably, the principle of benevolence and the doctrine of best interests 
underlie the sliding-scale nature of the application of the competency 
test.82 In other words, when a patient made decisions that were 
objectively “rational” and comported with what the physician thought 
was the best decision given the medical circumstances, there was more of 
a presumption of competency, and thus, a greater incidence of finding 
competency.83 When decisions were objectively seen as wholly “irrational” 
given the medical circumstances, the test for competency slid to a higher 
standard.84 To a certain extent, the physician was then more likely to find 
the individual “incompetent” to make the decision because her decision 
was not objectively in her best interests. 
For individuals involuntarily hospitalized because of an active 
psychosis or other condition that necessitated their psychiatric hold, all 
three decisional capacity factors weigh against recognizing that they 
possess decisional capacity to withhold release of information to a 
caregiver. When the individual is in the grips of acute psychosis and, for 
example, under a delusion that she is the Queen of England, making 
decisions for the good of her subjects, the values and goals she possesses 
 
 78. Appelbaum, supra note 77, at 1836 tbl. 1. 
 79. Loren H. Roth et al., Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134 Am. J. Psychiatry 
279, 280 (1977); see also Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, Mental Illness and Competence to 
Consent to Treatment, 19 Law & Hum. Behav. 105, 108 (1995) (“[D]epending on the facts of a case and 
precedent in that jurisdiction, court decisions might be based on one standard or some combination of 
standards.”).  
 80. See Roth et al., supra note 79.  
 81. Appelbaum, supra note 77, at 1836. 
 82. See infra Part III.A. 
 83. Roth et al., supra note 80, at 281. 
 84. See James F. Drane, Competency to Give an Informed Consent: A Model for Making Clinical 
Assessments, 252 JAMA 925, 925 (1984) (“Rather than selecting a single standard of competency, a sliding 
scale is suggested that requires an increasingly more stringent standard as the consequences of the patient’s 
decision embody more risk.”). 
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cannot reasonably be described as her own.85 Someone suffering from an 
acute episode of schizophrenia, and speaking in disorganized jumbles of 
sentences about persecution from everyone working with the government 
(and with no credible evidence to support such conclusions), cannot 
reasonably be said to “understand information” or “be able to reason and 
deliberate.”86 An individual suffering through a psychotic manic episode, 
rapidly cycling through thoughts that are disjointed and grandiose, cannot 
plausibly be described as able to “reason and deliberate” about her 
choices.87 
Indeed, the acute and drastic flare-up that brings an individual into 
an involuntary hold often happens because the individual’s underlying 
illness has progressed to a point where her capacity faculties are greatly 
diminished. When someone meets the criteria for an involuntary hold, 
there is strong evidence that she does not have the capacity at that point 
to make decisions regarding treatment88 or regarding the release of PHI 
to a family caretaker as part of that treatment. The state statutes that 
authorize involuntary holds have at their core the principle that at that 
time the individual lacks the capacity to make the decision to be taken in 
for evaluation. Therefore, another legally designated actor makes the 
determination for the individual, regardless of whether the individual 
wants the decision to be made; the hold is involuntary. Psychosis can last 
for varying periods, and might abate shortly after an individual is placed 
on an involuntary hold. However, even after an initial acute psychosis 
dissipates, many individuals with certain common psychiatric illnesses 
will continue to suffer from a lack of insight into their illness, a condition 
known as “anosognosia,”89 which will continue to impair two decisional 
 
 85. Janet L. Davies & Ellen H. Janosik, Mental Health and Psychiatric Nursing: A Caring 
Approach 760 (1991).  
 86. Such psychotic breaks can also be the result of substance abuse. Many times the presentation 
of symptoms overlaps so that accurate diagnosis takes some time. See Carol L.M. Caton et al., 
Differences Between Early-Phase Primary Psychotic Disorders With Concurrent Substance Use and 
Substance-Induced Psychoses, JAMA Psychiatry (Feb. 1, 2005), http://archpsyc.jamanetwork.com/ 
article.aspx?articleid=208288. Although the two causes may be distinct, the practical effect of their 
symptoms should apply equally for the decisional capacity analysis. 
 87. See David DiSalvo, What Really is a Psychotic Break with Reality?, Forbes (Aug. 10, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/daviddisalvo/2012/08/10/what-really-is-a-psychotic-break-with-reality/ 
(“‘[P]sychotic break with reality’ means losing contact with reality, such as hearing, seeing, tasting, 
smelling, or feeling something that has no external correlate (i.e., hallucinations) or believing 
something to be true that is false, fixed, and fantastic (i.e., a delusion) or being unable to sequence 
one’s thoughts or control a flight of ideas that becomes increasingly tangential (i.e., thought 
disordered), or emotions wildly inconsistent with external reality (such as catatonia, the wild flights of 
someone in a manic episode, or a complete absence of affect).”). 
 88. In California, an involuntary psychiatric hold by itself does not rebut the presumption of 
competency to make treatment decisions. See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 5326.5(d), 5331 (West 
2015); Riese v. St. Mary’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 271 Cal. Rptr. 199, 208 (Ct. App. 1987). 
 89. Anosognosia is commonly defined as “lack of insight” or not seeing what ails you. 
Anosognosia (Lack of Insight) Fact Sheet, NAMI, http://www2.nami.org/Content/NavigationMenu/ 
Mental_Illnesses/Schizophrenia9/Anosognosia_Fact_Sheet.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2015). Anosognosia 
R1 - Castro_14 (Dukanovic) (Do Not Delete) 8/27/2015  9:08 PM 
1786 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:1769 
capacity factors: the ability to communicate and understand information, 
and the ability to reason and deliberate about one’s choices. 
The discussion of decisional capacity centers around the question of 
whether the individual patient has the capacity to make a health care 
treatment decision. As this Note argues, the release of an individual’s 
medical information during an involuntary psychiatric hold should be 
liberalized to include informal family caregivers, under the rationale that 
such a release is part of the individual’s treatment. Thus, withholding or 
disseminating information can be seen as a treatment decision, which 
should not be left in the hands of an individual who is incapacitated at 
that time. The next Part discusses how vesting this decision completely in 
the hands of the incapacitated individual undermines the doctrine of best 
interests and does not comport with the actual spirit of the principle of 
autonomy. 
A. The Doctrinal Underpinnings of Health Care Decisionmaking 
The idea underlying the Privacy Rule and compassionate care for an 
incapacitated individual is the doctrine of best interests.90 Under the 
doctrine of best interests, a surrogate decisionmaker is required to make 
decisions that best promote the incapacitated individual’s welfare.91 
Interestingly enough, the doctrine of best interests initially increased the 
autonomy of incapacitated individuals during a time when incompetent 
or incapacitated persons were viewed as property of their guardians.92 
Thus, the foundation of the doctrine of best interests contains an element 
of increased autonomy. 
Today, the doctrine of best interests and its underlying principle of 
beneficence often stand counterpoised to the doctrine of “substituted 
judgment,” which seeks to uphold the principle of autonomy.93 The 
 
also commonly occurs in patients with Alzheimer’s disease and dementia. Id. Anosognosia is distinct 
from psychological denial, and is regarded as “a core feature of the neurobiology of these conditions.” 
Id.; see also Laura Flashman et al., Specific Frontal Lobe Subregions Correlated with Unawareness of 
Illness in Schizophrenia, 13 J. Neuropsychiatry Clinical Neuroscience 255, 256 (2001); Insight and 
Psychosis: Awareness of Illness in Schizophrenia and Related Disorders (Xavier F. Amador & 
Anthony S. David eds., 2d ed. 2004). In addition, the condition is the “single largest reason why people 
with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder do not take their medications.” Anosognosia (Impaired 
Awareness of Illness): A Major Problem for Individuals with Schizophrenia and Bipolar Disorder, 
Treatment Advoc. Center (June 2005), http://www.nami.org/Content/Microsites86/NAMI_Albuquerque/ 
Home82/Current_Activities/NAMIWalks6/Briefing-anosognosia_(05).pdf. 
 90. See supra Part I.B.  
 91. A. Frank Johns, Person-Centered Planning in Guardianship: A Little Hope for the Future, 
2012 Utah L. Rev. 1541, 1557 (2012). 
 92. Loretta M. Kopelman, The Best Interests Standard for Incompetent or Incapacitated Persons of 
All Ages, 35 J.L. Med. & Ethics 187, 187 (2007). Kopelman points out use of the best interests doctrine 
“does not require ignoring all other duties . . . or others’ interests in deciding what ought to be done 
for someone.” Id. at 188 (emphasis in original). 
 93. For further discussion on the principle of autonomy, see Dora W. Klein, Autonomy and Acute 
Psychosis: When Choices Collide, 15 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 355, 38889 (positing that mental illness 
R1 - Castro_14 (Dukanovic) (Do Not Delete) 8/27/2015 9:08 PM 
August 2015]                BALANCING PRIVACY AND HEALTH 1787 
“substituted judgment” doctrine often relies on evidence of the patient’s 
preferences, as laid out through directives or other oral or written 
statements of preference, in order to guide a surrogate decisionmaker in 
advancing an individual’s treatment wishes if and when the individual 
becomes incapacitated at a later time.94 If such evidence is not available, 
substituted judgment also asks the surrogate decisionmaker to “review 
the values of a formerly competent patient to determine” what to decide 
under the circumstances.95 This section will examine how the doctrines 
underlie the creation of statutory schemes regarding medical treatment 
decisions and guide current decisionmaking. 
B. Statutory Surrogates Act as Decisionmakers for Incapacitated 
Persons 
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
created a statutory scheme that seeks to incorporate these doctrines in a 
uniform and comprehensive act. The Uniform Health-Care Decisions 
Act (“UHCDA”) lists a hierarchy of surrogates who can serve as 
decisionmakers once the primary physician96 has determined that the 
individual lacks capacity (and there is no commonly used instrument like 
an advance directive to convey the patient’s instructions).97 These 
surrogates are the individuals who will use either “substituted judgment” 
or “best interests” to make the decision for the incapacitated patient. 
The exact list and its contours can vary from state to state.98 The 
UHCDA lists, in descending order of primacy: spouse, adult child, 
parents, sibling, close friend, and a residual exception for another adult 
who has exhibited special care and concern for the patient and is familiar 
 
limits autonomy to a greater degree, or in a more important way, than does involuntary treatment, and 
that true autonomy must include “freedom from internal constraint”). Another response to the 
argument of applying a traditional principle of autonomy even in cases of serious mental illness comes 
from the Supreme Court: “One who is suffering from a debilitating mental illness and in need of 
treatment is neither wholly at liberty nor free of stigma.” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979). 
 94. Furrow et al., supra note 22, at 1582. 
 95. Id. 
 96. The Act defines a “primary physician” as “a physician designated by an individual or the 
individual’s agent, guardian, or surrogate, to have primary responsibility for the individual’s health 
care or, in the absence of a designation or if the designated physician is not reasonably available, a 
physician who undertakes the responsibility.” Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act, supra 
note 75, § 1.  
 97. Id. The act has been adopted in whole by six states (Alaska, Hawaii, Maine, Mississippi, New 
Mexico, and Wyoming) and forms the basis of several states’ laws with regard to advance directives. 
Furrow et al., supra note 22, at 1583. 
 98. New York’s Family Health Care Decisions Act lists a “close friend” on the surrogacy list. 
N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2994-d(1)(f). The UHCDA does not list a “close friend” on the surrogacy 
list, but it does have a residual exemption for “an adult who has exhibited special care and concern for 
the patient, who is familiar with the patient’s personal values, and who is reasonably available.” 
Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act, supra note 75, § 5(c).  
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with the patient’s values.99 While some states have not adopted such a 
surrogate list, that decision is not necessarily based on uncertainty about 
the need for, or legitimacy of, a surrogate decisionmaker list.100 Instead, 
such a decision has notably been linked to pressure from groups 
concerned about issues such as same-sex couple recognition and whether 
the welfare of fetuses should be considered for incapacitated pregnant 
women.101 
Statutory surrogate lists dovetail with the long-standing standard 
medical practice of seeking consent regarding an incapacitated person’s 
treatment decisions from his or her close family members. Illustrating 
this view, the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems 
in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research suggested multiple 
reasons for traditional deference to family members, including that the 
family (1) is generally most concerned about the good of the patient; 
(2) deserves recognition as an important social unit that should be 
treated as a responsible decisionmaker in matters that intimately affect 
its members; and (3) will usually be most knowledgeable about the 
patient’s goals, preferences, and values.102 Of course, these assumptions 
may not always accurately reflect particular relationships between family 
members related by blood or marriage,103 but the Commission adopted a 
broader definition of family, as used within this Note.104 Indeed, the 
purpose of the UHCDA as a whole, and the statutes it inspired, is to 
ensure that decisionmaking power stays with the patient when she has 
capacity, and that authority stays “within the family” otherwise.105 
Here, the decision to release information to the family caregiver 
should remain with the family caregiver. With the authority to make 
health care decisions that is afforded to a statutory surrogate, family 
caregivers can make the decision to release information about an 
individual during an involuntary psychiatric hold to themselves. The 
states that have already adopted this portion of the UHCDA allow the 
family caretaker to have access to information about the patient, but only 
 
 99. Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act, supra note 75, § 5(b). 
 100. See, e.g., Jacob Appel, Finally Give N.Y. Families End-of-Life Decisionmaking Power, N.Y. 
Daily News (Sept. 26, 2009, 1:29 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/finally-give-n-y-families-
end-of-life-decisionmaking-power-article-1.402420.  
 101. Id. 
 102. President’s Comm’n for the Study of Ethical Problems in Med. & Biomedical & 
Behavioral Research, Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment: A Report on the Ethical, 
Medical, and Legal Issues in Treatment Decisions 127 (1983); Furrow et al., supra note 22, at 
1597 (noting family consent is “good medical practice (and good common sense) being subtlety 
absorbed by the law”). 
 103. See infra Part IV.D.2. 
 104. See supra note 4. 
 105. See Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act, supra note 75, § 6 cmt. at 26 (“Decisions should 
whenever possible be made by a patient, or the patient’s guardian, agent, or surrogate in consultation 
with the patient’s health-care providers without outside interference.”). 
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in limited circumstances; that is, where there is no advance directive, and 
then, depending on the doctrine used, when release of information is 
either in the best interests of the patient, or consistent with what the 
patient would have wanted if she was competent. 
C. Psychiatric Advance Directives as Evidence of Incapacitated 
Persons’ Preferences 
Advance directives are other tools used to deal with the problem of 
serving the underlying goal of autonomy within the doctrine of 
substituted judgment when an individual lacks decisional capacity. They 
are statutorily created legal tools that enhance the autonomy of the 
patient when appropriate.106 Advance directives refer to two different 
types of legal tools: individual instructions (for example, the living will) 
and durable powers of attorney (that is, the proxy or health care 
representative). Each can be completed separately, but people are often 
encouraged to complete both for comprehensive guidance. The UHCDA 
combines these tools. Whereas living wills are principally addressed at 
end of life decisionmaking,107 the durable power of attorney essentially 
designates an agent or proxy to speak for the individual and make 
selected health care decisions.108 Early on at common law, the power of 
attorney expired upon the “incapacity” of the principal.109 Subsequently, 
the Uniform Probate Code was amended to allow such a power to 
remain in effect and even become effective upon an individual’s 
incapacitation.110 Today, the vast majority of states have statutes that 
formally authorize the execution of durable powers of attorney for health 
care decisions.111 
An individual, while presumably having the requisite decisional 
capacity, creates an advance directive guiding a health care decision to be 
made at a later time, if and when that individual lacks decisional 
capacity. The individual instructions then guide the proxy in making a 
decision consistent with the individual’s previously expressed choice. 
Thus, the proxy has power to make designated decisions for the 
individual. When an individual does not designate a proxy, statutory 
surrogate lists like the UHCDA designate the decisionmaker.112 
 
 106. See Leslie P. Francis, Skeletons in the Family Medical Closet: Access of Personal Representatives to 
Interoperable Medical Records, 4 St. Louis U. J. Health L. & Pol’y 371, 392–93 (2011). 
 107. Furrow et al., supra note 22, at 1592 (discussing rise of living will statutes or “right to die” 
legislation after the Karen Quinlan case). In some states, they only address people who are terminally 
ill, or those in a persistent vegetative state. Id.   
 108. Id. at 1593. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id.; see, e.g., Cal. Prob. Code § 4124(b) (West 1994) (“This power of attorney shall become 
effective upon the incapacity of the principal.”).  
 112. See supra Part III.B. 
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Proponents of the use of advance directives herald them for their 
autonomy-enhancing qualities.113 From an autonomy-centric point of 
view, advance directives do allow an individual to specify in advance 
whether certain representatives will have access to her medical records.114 
However, that argument does not consider individuals with severe mental 
illness who lack insight into their illnesses and may be placed on 
involuntary psychiatric holds often.115 Without awareness of their illness, 
a patient in this situation is almost certain not to enact any instruction or 
create any durable power of attorney in another to receive information. 
In fact, in many of the severe cases, the individual may not even have the 
requisite decisional capacity to execute a valid individual instruction or a 
durable power of attorney. Furthermore, if she did, it stands to reason 
that she might do so merely to try to avoid treatment or dissemination of 
information regarding an illness that she might insist that she does not 
have. 
Such severe cases arguably fall under a “need to know” approach to 
releasing PHI, because the information is relevant to current decisions 
about protecting and treating the patient now and in the future.116 A 
limitation on the information released to personal representatives on a 
“need to know” basis lacks substantive distinction when that personal 
representative is a family caregiver. The individual’s current symptoms, 
diagnosis, treatment plan options, and prognosis are all critical to the 
family caregiver so as to integrate her into the treatment plan and allow 
her to plan future accommodations. Finding out where a loved one is 
being kept on a 5150 is “need to know.”117 Even when the individual 
being held is not chronically in the hospital, a so-called “frequent 
flyer,”118 the rationale still applies. Important medication changes, follow-
up doctor visits, additional medication changes, and what is happening to 
the patient in an involuntary psychiatric hold are all “need to know” 
details for the family caregiver for purposes of releasing PHI. 
Some have argued that the doctrine of substituted judgment, which 
underpins the use of advance directives, is too speculative to be applied 
reliably, and that there is simply no way to protect the autonomy of a 
 
 113. See generally Francis, supra note 106 (examining advance directives as implemented by states and 
making recommendations). 
 114. Id. at 393. 
 115. Estimated at forty percent and fifty percent for cases of bipolar and schizophrenia, respectively. See 
Anosognosia, supra note 89. 
 116. Francis, supra note 106, at 395. 
 117. See supra note 3. 
 118. See Linda Paradiso, Frequent Flyers: Treat Returning Psychiatric Patients Like Valued Customers, 
Nurse.com (May 27, 2013), https://news.nurse.com/2013/05/27/frequent-flyerstreat-returning-psychiatric-
patients-like-valued-customers/ (defining and criticizing the term used by hospital staff “to describe the 
patients who are admitted often to our psychiatric units”). 
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patient without decisional capacity.119 In the case where there is no 
possible method for establishing what the autonomous patient would do 
if she had capacity, bioethicists and courts move to the second principle 
of health care decisionmaking—beneficence—and rely on the doctrine of 
best interests to guide the decisionmaker.120 This approach supports the 
adoption of the doctrine of best interests in this context, and allows the 
decisionmaker to have access to the PHI of the incapacitated individual. 
Unfortunately, commentators have argued that advance care 
directives are more likely to be upheld when patients are refusing 
treatment and asserting autonomy rather than requesting treatment and 
beneficence, at least in the context of involuntary psychiatric holds.121 
Thus, the analogous problem exists where advance directives that refuse 
to allow dissemination of information to anyone in the case of an 
involuntary psychiatric hold may be upheld whereas advance directives 
that direct a release of information may not. This problem suggests that 
advance directives for the direct release of information may be on a 
shakier practical ground, and thus, not an ideal avenue for attacking the 
problem. Nevertheless, the increased publicity and attention of advance 
directives suggests that these tools may form part of the solution122 
because individuals could create advance directives to release PHI to 
family caregivers ahead of time. 
IV.  Solutions to Promote Disclosure 
A. College Admissions Processes Could Encourage Advanced 
Consent to Release Information to Designated Family Members 
Because advance directives are generally regarded as autonomy 
enhancing, they form a good starting point to discuss solutions. The 
 
 119. Furrow et al., supra note 22, at 1583; see also Rebecca S. Dresser, Advance Directives, Self-
Determination, and Personal Identity, in Advance Directives in Medicine 155, 157 (1989) (stating 
“future-oriented treatment decisions cannot be equated with the active choices of competent 
patients”); Louise Harmon, Falling Off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of Substituted Judgment, 
100 Yale L.J. 1, 67 n.269 (1990). 
 120. See, e.g., Roger B. Dworkin, Getting What We Should From Doctors: Rethinking Patient-
Autonomy and the Doctor Patient Relationship, 13 Health Matrix 235, 28486 (referring to doctrine 
of best interests as “[a] better way to decide what should be done for incompetent patient . . . [that] 
requires focus on reality, rather than fiction, and . . . considers many relevant interests, not just one”). 
 121. Justine A. Dunlap, Mental Health Advance Directives: Having One’s Say?, 89 Ky. L.J. 327, 
35658 (2000) (noting constitutional right to refuse treatment, but not to obtain treatment); see also 
Margo Flug, No Commitment: Kendra’s Law Makes No Promise of Adequate Mental Health Treatment, 
10 Geo. J. Poverty Law & Pol’y 105, 121 (2003) (“Proxies are generally viewed as a means for patients 
to refuse unwanted treatment rather than to demand desired treatment.”). 
 122. President Barack Obama purportedly became the first U.S. president to acknowledge he has an 
advance directive. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in an AARP Tele-Town Hall on 
Health Care Reform (July 28, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-
the-President-in-AARP-Tele-Town-Hall-on-Health-Care-Reform/.  
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Family Education Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”)123 currently allows 
post-secondary educational institutions to “disclose information from 
education records to any person whose knowledge of the information is 
necessary to protect the health or safety of the student or other 
individuals.”124 This FERPA exception is limited to the period of the 
emergency and the information needed to address the emergency.125 
Post-secondary educational institutions often condition enrollment 
on meeting certain medical requirements.126 Accordingly, post-secondary 
educational institutions could strongly encourage students during 
enrollment to sign a waiver to explicitly authorize the release of necessary 
health information to their parents (or other appropriate designated 
caregiver) in the event of a medical emergency that involves serious 
medical or mental health conditions in which treating professionals or 
school authorities reasonably believe that involvement of the identified 
family member would be in the student’s best interest. The release could 
limit the amount of information to only as much as necessary to serve that 
student’s best interest. Such an initiative is strongly supported by the 
reality that many mental illnesses manifest during late teenage years, 
precisely the time that many students in the United States enter and 
attend college.127 
An optional advance directive will have drawbacks.128 While 
proponents of an optional waiver may argue that merely bringing up the 
topic is a sufficient enough impetus to have students and parents agree to 
sign such a waiver, experience counsels that young adults often think 
they are “invincible.”129 The motivation to deny the possibility of illness is 
 
 123. For general information on FERPA, see Family Education Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 
U.S. Dept. Educ., http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/ferpa/index.html. 
 124. 34 C.F.R. § 99.36 (2010). 
 125. Faculty Handbook Provides Guidance in Assisting Students in Distress; FERPA Privacy 
Exceptions Permit Faculty Intervention/Referral, 32 Dev. Mental Health L. 4, 7 (2013). 
 126. State Information: Meningococcal Prevention Mandates for Colleges and Universities, 
Immunize.org, http://www.immunize.org/laws/menin.asp (showing most states require vaccination as a 
condition of enrollment). Even before the enactment of the Affordable Care Act, “about 30 percent of 
colleges nationwide required students to have health insurance . . . and some states also [had] health 
insurance requirements for college students.” U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-08-389, 
Health Insurance: Most College Students Are Covered Through Employer-Sponsored Plans, and Some 
Colleges and States Are Taking Steps to Increase Coverage (Mar. 2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/ 
new.items/d08389.pdf. 
 127. See Mental Illness Exacts Heavy Toll, supra note 44 (“Half of all lifetime cases begin by age 
14; three quarters have begun by age 24. Thus, mental disorders are really the chronic diseases of the 
young.”). 
 128. An alternative proposal would consist of a mandatory advance directive. While such a 
requirement resolves the drawbacks of an optional form, it also raises constitutional questions. The 
Author suggests a nonmandatory option for its decreased risk of litigation and its comparative ease of 
implementation now, and the exploration of a mandatory requirement in the near future. 
 129. Alexandra Petri, President Obama Is Funny, Mean, Promoting Healthcare.gov on “Between Two 
Ferns”, Wash. Post (March 11, 2014) https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/compost/wp/ 
2014/03/11/president-obama-is-funny-mean-promoting-healthcare-gov-on-between-two-ferns/ (providing 
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even stronger when dealing with stigmatized illnesses such as major 
depression, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and so forth.130 It is a rare 
student (or parent) who contemplates (or even wants to contemplate) 
the possibility of such illness. And talking to someone during her difficult 
transition from adolescence to young adulthood is already difficult for 
families.131 However, the implementation of this advance directive would 
further enhance the existing autonomy rationale underlying the use of 
advance directives in health care planning. Creating an advance directive 
triggers contemplation and planning. This planning process also gives the 
young person choice in assigning who receives her PHI in the event of an 
involuntary psychiatric hold or similar medical emergency, thus directly 
addressing any fears about a possible loss of autonomy associated with 
an automatic release of PHI. Thus, it empowers her to choose the 
individuals who she feels are most likely to be effective caregivers should 
the situation present itself. The college advance directive also allows the 
young person to exclude relatives whom she does not want to have access 
to her information, for reasons including strained relations or a judgment 
that certain individuals would not be effective caregivers or productive in 
the treatment process. 
Although some critics may argue that encouraging students to 
create an advance directive violates HIPAA’s underlying policy, this 
requirement actually addresses critics’ concerns regarding individual 
autonomy. If HIPAA’s underlying justification is to protect an 
individual’s choice, broadly defined, then such a rule would seem to 
invite litigation. However, if HIPAA’s underlying justification is 
correctly seen as empowering individuals in making their health care 
choices, then the impetus of such a requirement actually effectuates the 
exercise of choice. The individual is empowered to designate caregivers 
to receive information at an earlier time when she has more capacity, as 
opposed to waiting until her decisional capacity is called into question by 
an acute psychotic episode and manifestations of mental illness, then 
leaving the designation and decision up to a statutory surrogacy list. This 
 
link to video clip); see also Kathrine Vargas, Why Do Young People Need Obamacare?, WhiteHouse.gov 
(Sept. 28, 2013, 11:26 AM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/09/28/why-do-young-people-need-
obamacare. 
 130. “Stigma among emerging adults persists the notion that it is shameful to suffer from a 
behavioral health issue and that coming forward to seek diagnosis and treatment will limit academic 
and vocational achievement. Social stigma leads to needless embarrassment, especially when associated 
with peer groups. It is not surprising, to find that only 1 in 3 students that need mental health care will 
actually seek assistance.” Ashley Clement, Breaking Down Barriers to Mental Health Services in 
Emerging Adulthood, 13 Harv. Health Pol’y Rev. 32, 32 (2012). 
 131. Developmental psychologists, mental health professionals, and other scholars now refer to the 
developmental stage between adolescence and early adulthood as “emergent adulthood.” Jeffrey J. 
Arnett, Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Development from the Late Teens Through the Twenties, 
55 Am. Psychologist, 469, 470 (2000).  
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proposal’s strongest upside is its incorporation of the traditional 
understanding of autonomy. 
The real downside to relying on this advance directive solution is 
that it only reaches a fraction of the undefined demographic that will at 
some point go into an involuntary psychiatric hold. Not everyone in the 
United States attends post-secondary schools.132 Furthermore, the 
initiative would not reach anyone who has already moved passed the 
enrollment process at a college or university. And as it is optional, many 
students may not choose to create an advance directive. Thus, this 
proposal is not ideal, because leaving out those broad swaths of society 
fails to provide a comprehensive solution. Nevertheless, it is still an 
option available to reach a large number of college-bound youths. 
B. Expansive Interpretation of “Treatment” Could Include 
Communications with Family Caregivers 
As discussed above, there is ample evidence to support the finding 
that family members are an important part of the treatment process in 
treating an individual with severe mental illness.133 If the family 
caregivers’ role is recognized as that of a treatment provider,134 then the 
release of information is permitted under current HIPAA language.135 
However, the release of information under the “treatment” provision of 
HIPAA is still permissive.136 That means providers still run into the same 
pitfalls that prevent disclosure of information today: financial burden, 
staff burden, and institutional inertia.137 While the DHHS can issue more 
guidance and education to providers in an effort to try to counteract 
those barriers, previous guidance letters to treatment providers have 
proven to be unsuccessful in changing provider policy. The “treatment 
provider” solution still suffers from the lack of a requirement on the 
providers to comply and release information. If this solution is to be 
 
 132. In October 2013, 65.9% of 2013 high school graduates were enrolled in colleges or universities. 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, College Enrollment and Work Activity of 2013 High School Graduates 
(Apr. 16, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/hsgec.nr0.htm. 
 133. See supra note 33. 
 134. See, e.g., Janki Shankar & Senthil Sonai Muthuswamy, Support Needs of Family Caregivers of 
People Who Experience Mental Illness and the Role of Mental Health Services, Families in Society, J. 
Contemp. Soc. Services 302 (2007) (“Family caregivers are an irreplaceable resource for the mental health 
services system and the pillars on which the system currently rests.”); Family Caregiving, Am. Psychol. 
Ass’n, http://www.apa.org/about/gr/issues/cyf/caregiving-facts.aspx (describing general family caregiving 
duties as including medical care adherence monitoring). 
 135. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506 (2014). 
 136. Some question might remain as to whether some of the PHI of an individual on an involuntary 
psychiatric hold falls under the “psychotherapy notes” characterization, which requires authorization 
of the individual. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(2) (2014). For the most part, however, these categories of 
PHI are well-defined. See HIPAA Privacy Rule and Sharing Information, supra note 8 (listing various 
categories of information that would not fall under “psychotherapy notes”). 
 137. See supra Part I.B. 
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further developed, the focus should remain on devising a requirement 
that will ensure provider compliance. 
C. An Amendment to the HIPAA Privacy Rule Can Clarify That 
Physicians Can Release Protected Health Information to a 
Family Caregiver 
A more straightforward and inclusive approach to the problem is to 
designate a family caretaker as a personal representative within the 
provisions of the Privacy Rule. There is proposed legislation that would 
designate a family caretaker as a “personal representative” for the Privacy 
Rule’s purposes, among other purposes.138 Congressman Tim Murphy of 
Pennsylvania introduced legislation in the 20132014 congressional term 
to clarify the Privacy Rule and “the Family Educational Rights and 
Privacy Act so physicians and mental health professionals can provide 
crucial information to parents and caregivers about a loved one who is in 
an acute mental health crisis to protect their health, safety, and well-
being.”139 Congressman Murphy reintroduced this bill in the 114th session 
of Congress.140 Under this proposal, a “caregiver” of an individual with a 
serious mental illness is defined as an immediate family member, who 
assumes primary responsibility for providing a basic need of such 
individual, or a personal representative determined by the laws of the 
state.141 The bill also defines “an individual with serious mental illness” as 
someone (1) eighteen years or older (2) who has been diagnosed (within 
one year of the date of information disclosure) with “a mental, 
behavioral, or emotional disorder” that meets the diagnostic criteria of 
the Diagnostics and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, and (3) 
“results in functional impairment of the individual that substantially 
interferes with or limits one or more major life activities of the 
individual.”142 The proposed amendment to HIPAA would directly allow 
a family caretaker to receive PHI about an individual who is held on an 
involuntary psychiatric hold without requiring the individual’s explicit 
consent. The proposal only affects adults eighteen years and older 
because before then, adult caretakers such as parents or guardians of an 
 
 138. The Helping Families in Mental Health Crisis Act, H.R. 3717, 113th Cong. § 301(a) (2013), 
available at http://murphy.house.gov/uploads/HR3717%20Bill%20Text.pdf. 
 139. See supra note 38; see also H.R. 3717 113th Cong. § 301(a). 
 140. Reps. Murphy and Johnson Reintroduce the Helping Families in Mental Health Crisis Act, 
Congressman Tim Murphy (June 4, 2015), http://murphy.house.gov/latest-news/reps-murphy-and-
johnson-reintroduce-the-helping-families-in-mental-health-crisis-act/.  
 141. Id. Murphy’s bill indicates basic needs include “food, clothing, shelter, health, or safety,” as 
well as “assum[ing] the responsibility of co-signing a loan with the individual.” H.R. 3717 113th Cong. 
§§ 705(3)(D), 302(k)(2)(A). 
 142. H.R. 3717 113th Cong. § 302(k)(2)(C). 
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individual generally have access to their health information.143 Murphy’s 
proposal also includes caregiver access to certain education records 
under FERPA when the treating mental health professional “reasonably 
believes such disclosure to the caregiver is necessary to protect the 
health, safety, or welfare” of that individual or others.144 This additional 
piece of informational access allows the caregiver to have access to medical 
treatment-related documents that high schools and post-secondary 
educational institutions will hold regarding incidents, treatments, and 
evaluations that occur at school. 
This approach has a number of advantages. It easily works its way 
into the language of the existing Privacy Rule. Providers can easily 
understand that once the Privacy Rule recognizes someone as a 
“personal representative,” that representative is entitled to receive the 
individual’s PHI, subject to the endangerment exception.145 The proposed 
bill also requires the provider to consider the family caregiver a “personal 
representative” when the provider “reasonably believes it is necessary . . . 
to protect the health, safety, or welfare of such individual or the safety of 
one or more individuals.”146 Also, the inclusion of access to records under 
FERPA gives the caretaker more information regarding the nature of the 
individual’s illness, further facilitating the caregiver’s ability to assist with 
treatment. 
One possible criticism of the proposal rests on the notion that 
allowing all “immediate family members” the designation of “personal 
representative” for HIPAA purposes could lead to dissemination of 
information to family members who have no role in the treatment of the 
individual or her life generally. That would not address the real problem 
this Note seeks to remedy, that of providing important information to 
actual caretakers, and may actually complicate matters further for the 
individual. One response to this criticism is to remove the “immediate 
family member” clause because the subsequent clause already includes 
the established family caregiver“an individual who assumes primary 
responsibility for providing a basic need of such individual.”147 Thus, 
“immediate family member” becomes duplicative when the immediate 
family member actually assumes primary responsibility for caring for the 
individual. A second response is that the additional disclosure would not 
 
 143. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(g)(3)(i) (2014). This depends on the particular governing state law. See 
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82582 (Dec. 28, 
2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164) (“Where states have . . . explicitly acted, for example, to 
authorize disclosure, defer the decision to disclose to the discretion of the health care provider, or 
prohibit disclosure of minor’s protected health information to a parent, the rule defers to these 
decisions to the extent that they regulate such disclosures.”).  
 144. H.R. 3717 113th Cong. § 301(a). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
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be harmful given HIPAA’s existing “endangerment exception” protection 
against releasing information that would endanger the individual.148 
D. Important Considerations 
With any of the three previously proposed solutions, other existing 
HIPAA provisions would still apply additional considerations to the 
release of information. The first provision provides guidance on how much 
PHI is released. The second provision serves as an important exception to 
inappropriate release of PHI. 
1. The Breadth of the Protected Health Information Released Would 
Fall Under Exceptions to the Minimum Necessary Rule 
Under HIPAA, the amount of PHI released is generally limited to 
the “minimum amount of protected health information needed to 
accomplish the intended purpose of the use, disclosure, or request.”149 
However, this “minimum necessary” rule does not apply when a health 
care provider requests or receives information for treatment purposes, 
and an individual’s personal representative requests the information, or 
when disclosure is required by law.150 If a release of PHI to a designated 
caregiver is indicated by an advance directive, the caregiver can be 
considered the individual’s personal representative. If informing family 
members is considered treatment under HIPAA, then that release of 
information is for treatment. Under Congressman Murphy’s proposal, 
the disclosure is made to the individual’s personal representative. Thus, 
all three of this Note’s proposed solutions fall within the exceptions to 
the “minimum necessary” limit on information disclosure. These 
exceptions recognize the need for wide disclosure for treatment purposes, 
because the PHI encompasses much important information to take into 
consideration when formulating treatment plans involving a family 
caregiver. 
On the other hand, allowing access to an individual’s entire PHI 
may be inappropriate and impractical. First, allowing access to information 
unrelated to an individual’s mental illness diagnosis and caretaking needs 
appears extraneous to the purpose of these proposed exceptions, and 
unnecessarily encroaches on an individual’s privacy with respect to that 
extraneous information. Second, providers will need guidance on what 
amount of information can be released so as to protect this privacy 
interest. One possibility is to include language that the “minimum 
necessary” rule applies to these exceptions, which would limit this to the 
purpose of the disclosure. A second option is to include new language 
 
 148. See infra Part IV.D.2. 
 149. Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. 10 (May 2003). 
 150. Id. 
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that limits the information released to that “necessary for the family 
member to perform caregiving and supportive roles.” 
2. A Safety Rationale for Cabining PHI Disclosure to Family 
Members Generally Already Applies 
One consideration that must be weighed against both statutory 
surrogate lists and expansion of HIPAA to release information to 
informal family caregivers is problematic family circumstances. The law 
generally assumes that parents, for example, will act in the best interests 
of a child.151 Biological family members need not be completely altruistic 
in order to want to achieve the “best interests” of their family member 
with mental illness. However, there are undoubtedly situations where 
past problems, or fundamental differences in values have created such 
tension and discord that a biological family member may not care about 
the best interests of another, or may actually want to harm them. In other 
situations, biological family members may not understand the 
information that they receive, or may not believe the diagnosis or illness 
itself.152 These scenarios present the distinct possibility that the biological 
family member may not want to be part of the treatment team, or would 
currently be an ineffective member of the team. 
In such cases, the health care provider should be able to withhold 
the release of information if, in her professional judgment, the particular 
family member’s involvement would have a detrimental effect on the 
course of the treatment or on the best interests of the patient. In the 
context of a health care decision for an adolescent, the Supreme Court 
recognized in Parham v. J.R. that a parent’s authority to make a decision 
must be “subject to a physician’s independent examination and medical 
judgment.”153 The Privacy Rule already codifies this important standard. 
The Privacy Rule itself allows for the health care provider to use her 
professional judgment to deny a personal representative access to PHI if 
the minor “may be endangered by treating the person as the personal 
representative, and . . . it is not in the best interests of the patient . . . .”154 
Thus, the Privacy Rule already affords the health care provider the 
ability to avoid automatically releasing information to someone when, in 
essence, that someone is not acting as an actual “caregiver” of the 
patient. Furthermore, in addition to the health records of the individual, 
health care providers also have access to other public records that may 
 
 151. See Parham v. J.R, 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (noting that the “natural bonds of affection lead 
parents to act in the best interests of their children”). 
 152. See, e.g., Boldt, supra note 46, at 76 (“Steve is reluctant to consent to the disclosure of this 
information to his parents because of his father’s intolerant attitude toward the use of alcohol and 
other drugs.”). 
 153. 442 U.S. at 604. 
 154. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(g)(5) (2014); see also HIPAA Privacy Rule and Sharing Information, 
supra note 8, at n.2. 
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indicate a negative relationship (for example, a restraining order) and 
the health care provider’s own interactions with the person claiming to 
be the caregiver and seeking access to the information based on being a 
caregiver. The provider can and should rely on a review of this evidence 
to arrive at her reasonable belief that a particular request for information 
falls under the endangerment exception. 
Conclusion 
The HIPAA Privacy Rule seeks to afford people the right and 
ability to control access to their sensitive health care information. 
Generally, that is a good thing. But the Privacy Rule does make a 
notable exception for when an individual lacks capacity to make the 
decision to release that information. In the case of involuntary psychiatric 
holds, individuals often lack decisional capacity because of the acute 
episode, whether an initial episode or a chronic episode, that necessitated 
their psychiatric hold. Due to the current permissive nature of the 
incapacity exception, providers routinely refuse to release information to 
the family caregivers involved in the individual’s current and long-term 
health. Because of the incentives for health care providers, they 
consistently avoid disclosure without express consent from the individual 
on the involuntary psychiatric hold. In order to empower families and the 
community to better deal with these difficult mental illness challenges, as 
well as serve the best interests of the patients themselves, the “default” 
of health care providers should be set in the interest of disclosure to 
family caregivers as part of treatment. This recognizes the reality of many 
severe mental illnesses, and helps health care providersprofessionals 
and familyhelp someone in need. 
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